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THE EFFECT OF BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION AND
CONTRACTION ON ITS MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY OF THE
HARRISBURG SENATORS
STANLEY M. BRAND* & ANDREWJ. GIORGIONE**
After the 2001 season, Major League Baseball ("MLB") Com-
missioner Bud Selig announced that two teams would be con-
tracted. This announcement renewed interest in professional
baseball's antitrust exemption.' Although previous contraction was
reported, Commissioner Selig's official announcement predictably
triggered a host of congressional reactions. 2 One reaction was from
the late Senator Paul Wellstone, who introduced a bill to repeal
baseball's immunity with respect to the elimination or relocation of
major league teams. 3 His bill illustrated that interest in the anti-
trust exemption remains as the debate over contraction lingers.4
Senator Wellstone's bill was designed to curtail baseball's anti-
trust exemption. 5 The introduction of this bill caused considerable
* Stanley M. Brand, Esq., is a founding principal of Brand & Frulla, P.C., a
Washington, D.C. based civil and criminal litigation firm. Since 1992, he has also
served as Vice President of the National Association of Professional Baseball
Leagues Inc., the governing body of Minor League Baseball.
** AndrewJ. Giorgione, Esq., is the partner-in-charge of the Harrisburg office
of Obermayer Rebmann Maxwell & Hippel, LLP. Mr. Giorgione serves as general
counsel to the Harrisburg Civic Baseball Club, Inc. This entity owns the Harris-
burg Senators Minor League Baseball franchise. Mr. Giorgione previously served
as City Solicitor to the City of Harrisburg. As City Solicitor, he represented Harris-
burg in its purchase of the Harrisburg Senators franchise in 1995 and obtained
approval of that transaction from Major League Baseball.
1. See Fairness in Antitrust in National Sports (FANS) Act of 2001: Hearing on H.I
3288 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciay, 107th Cong. 4-8 (2001) [hereinafter
Hearings 2001] (statement of Bud Selig, Commissioner, MLB).
2. See Murray Chass, Whispers Turn To Talk of Eliminating Clubs, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 2000, § 8, at 5 (reporting renewal of discussions to eliminate professional
teams as solution to baseball's economic problems).
3. See Fairness in Antitrust in National Sports (FANS) Act of 2001, S. 1704,
107th Cong. § 2 (2001). The purpose of the Act is to "eliminat[e] or relocat[e] ...
major league baseball franchises ... covered under the antitrust laws, and to make
clear that the enactment of this Act does not change the application of the anti-
trust laws in any other context or with respect to any other person or entity." Id.
4. See Bill Madden & Michael O'Keeffe, Hardball to the Very End: Players and
Owners Talk as Strike Looms, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Aug. 30, 2002, at 3 (describing negoti-
ation struggle among players and team owners in efforts to avoid work stoppage).
5. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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and justifiable alarm throughout Minor League Baseball. 6 In 1998,
Minor League Baseball worked diligently to ensure that the Curt
Flood Act of 1998 protected not only MLB, but Minor League Base-
ball as well. 7 Despite these efforts, Minor League Baseball still be-
lieves that any attempt to limit or change baseball's antitrust
exemption threatens Minor League Baseball, contradicts public
policy, and defeats the goals for which the antitrust exemption was
proffered.8
Minor League Baseball is comprised of 206 teams in twenty
leagues, which play professional baseball in the United States, Ca-
nada, and Mexico at the AAA, AA, A, and rookie levels. 9 The
league consists of approximately 5548 active players.10 In 2001,
close to thirty-nine million fans attended baseball games at the mi-
nor league level."I
Inevitably, the repeal of baseball's antitrust exemption would
affect the incentive that MLB has to continue its investment in the
minor leagues, which could lead to the elimination of many minor
league teams, particularly at the Rookie and A levels.' 2 Under the
6. Peter M. Macaluso, Bang the Gavel Slowly: A Call forJudicial Activism Following
the Curt Flood Act, 9 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 463, 472 (2000) (noting that owners of
Minor League Baseball teams fear inadequate antitrust protection would be detri-
mental to relationship between Minor League Baseball and MLB); see also Gary R.
Roberts, A Brief Appraisal of The Curt Flood Act of 1998 from the Minor League Perspec-
tive, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 413, 420-21 (1999) (noting Minor League Baseball has
been most effective opponent to repeal of baseball antitrust exclusion).
7. See Roberts, supra note 6, at 420-21 (noting most protections written into
language of Curt Flood Act at behest of minor leagues were designed to protect
major leagues from antitrust exposure for all non-player matters previously pro-
tected by federal law); see also Murray Chass, Deal Struck on Antitrust Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
July 30, 1998, at C3 (noting Vice President of National Association of Professional
Baseball Leagues ("NAPBL") allayed concerns of minor league players by assuring
continued survival of Minor League Baseball).
8. See Jason Barkham, Ending Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, at http://www.
baseballprospectus.com/news/20011126barkham.html (Nov. 26, 2001) (noting
minor leagues have lobbied Congress to preserve baseball's antitrust exemption
because without exemption, minor leagues would have to change their operations,
becoming more like "free" minor leagues of first half of twentieth century inde-
pendent from, as opposed to partners with, MLB).
9. See Minor League Baseball, at http://www.milb.com/list/?action=alpha.html
(last visited Nov. 17, 2002).
10. See id.
11. SeeJoe Kay, Minor Leagues Flourish While Major Leagues Flounder, SuN-NEwS
(Myrtle Beach, S.C.), Aug. 27, 2002, at B2 ("While the major leagues confront the
possibility of another strike, the minors are doing what they do best-providing
good times to capacity crowds."), available at 2002 WL 24674314.
12. See Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Economic
and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 114-29 (1994)
[hereinafter Hearings 1994] (statement of Stanley M. Brand, Vice President,
NAPBL).
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ANTITRUST EXEMPTION'S EFFECTS
current Professional Baseball Agreement ("PBA"), the individual
major league club that signs and rosters the players pays minor
league players' salaries. 13 In 1993, MLB spent over $130 million on
direct minor league development costs (including minor league
players' salaries) and another $90 million on players' bonuses and
scouting to facilitate talent development.' 4 It is this subsidy that
assists in underwriting the presence of Minor League Baseball in
small towns throughout the United States.' 5
In the event of repeal, the minor league player draft and re-
serve clause might be challenged as illegal restraints of trade under
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 16 Moreover, the PBA between the
major and minor leagues, which ensures a competitive balance
among MLB teams in player acquisition and retention, might be
challenged as illegal under sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act.17
Even if Minor League Baseball were to prevail on an antitrust claim,
the litigation costs of defending such a charge would threaten the
league's survival. In the end, minor league player development
13. See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL RULES §§ 3(b)-(c) (2002) (explaining origin
of minor league salaries); see also Hearings 1994 supra note 12, at 117 (explaining
relationship between Major League Baseball and Minor League Baseball under
terms of Professional Baseball Agreement ("PBA")). Most major league teams
have a "direct one-on-one relationship ... with a AAA team, a AA team, and a
single A team... under which they have a direct contractual relationship and they
pay for the coaches' salaries and the players' salaries on those minor league
teams." Id.
14. See Hearings 1994, supra note 12, at 124.
15. See Hearings 2001, supra note 1, at 99 (setting forth December 4, 2001
letter from Stanley Brand to James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman of the Commit-
tee on Judiciary).
16. See Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1967)
(noting some restraint on competition for players' services necessarily could vio-
late antitrust laws); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (observing every restraint on competition for players' services necessarily
would violate antitrust laws); see also Michael Jay Kaplan, Annotation, Application of
Federal Antitrust Laws to Professional Sports, 18 A.L.R. FED. 489, 515 (1974).
The so-called "reserve clause," used by several professional sports in the
past and still retained in varying forms by some, is a contract provision
which, in the setting of other agreements, has been held to perpetually
operate to remove from a player his free choice of teams, thereby having
a restraining effect on the interstate market of players. Whether the
player was initially cultivated through the "farm system" of league-affili-
ated minor teams, or "drafted" from collegiate or other amateur ranks,
once a particular team has received from the league the right to negoti-
ate with a particular player, no other team is allowed to invade that right
by making any advances toward that player.
Id.
17. See Phila. World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Phila. Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462, 496 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (rejecting argument that National Hockey League
can invoke labor exemptions and therefore be excluded from prosecution under
Sherman Act).
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would be stripped of its stability created by the player draft, reserve
clause, and the PBA. Minor League Baseball has virtually no televi-
sion revenue, and ticket sales and fence sign advertising do not gen-
erate sufficient cash flow to support a legion of lawyers.' 8 The
effect of eliminating the antitrust exemption would be quite severe
because it would harm communities, careers, and people associated
with baseball at both the major and minor league levels. 19
This reduced output at the minor league level is antithetical to
the policy underlying the antitrust laws to increase the quantity of
the product.20 Accordingly:
One can speculate that even in the absence of an agree-
ment to sign players to uniform contracts with renewal op-
tions, major league organizations individually have
superior bargaining power that will permit them to sign
hundreds of lower level players to the same kind of one
year agreements with successive yearly options that are
now required. If the antitrust laws are applicable, how will
MLB clubs assess the risk that such a pattern will be chal-
lenged as being illegally collusive? 21
Is it not likely that MLB clubs will attempt to avoid this risk and
reduce their expenses by shifting this risk of employing the players
to the minor league teams? This is a burden that Minor League
Baseball cannot afford.
18. See Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Economic
and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 202-04 (1993)
[hereinafter Hearings 1993] (illustrating average gross revenue of minor league
clubs during 1991 was $631,136 and median net income of minor league clubs in
1991 was loss of $33,511).
19. See Hearings 1994, supra note 12, at 123.
If MLB determines that antitrust laws make it too risky to draft and then
reserve players for six years, the nature of MLB's investment in minor
league players could change dramatically. Without the reserve clause,
MLB can be expected to spend money on many fewer minor league play-
ers. MLB will not spend money signing prospects in the hope that they
develop only to have them subject to being acquired by other teams due
to their short-term contracts. With the signing of few minor league play-
ers overall, there will naturally be fewer minor league teams. This loss of
teams would adversely affect numerous player development investments
in facilities. The loss to consumers of affordable, intimate and whole-
some entertainment provided by minor league clubs could be extensive,
particularly in smaller communities and markets.
Id.
20. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107-08
("Restrictions on price and output are the paradigmatic examples of restraints of
trade that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit.").
21. Hearings 1994, supra note 12.
[Vol. 10: p. 49
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Some have suggested that the first-year player draft can be up-
held under a "rule of reason" analysis.22 Yet, the minor league draft
will likely be subject to challenge since minor league players, unlike
NBA and NFL players, are not part of a collective bargaining unit
and, therefore, are left unprotected by the antitrust exemption.23
For all of the foregoing reasons, Minor League Baseball and
the members of Congress representing minor league clubs and
their communities fought hard to include a clear and comprehen-
sive "carve out" for the minor leagues during the enactment of the
Curt Flood Act of 1998.24 The "carve out" was negotiated among
representatives of MLB, the Players Association, and Minor League
Baseball, and was incorporated into the final legislation. Upon ex-
amination, it appears that Senator Wellstone's bill does not directly
parallel the Curt Flood Act as it was purported to do. The changes
imposed by Senator Wellstone's bill were to be restricted to the sub-
ject of the Act so that the bill would lift baseball's antitrust exemp-
tion with respect to contraction and franchise relocation.2 5
Instead, the actual text of the bill deletes certain language from the
Curt Flood Act unrelated to contraction and franchise relocation. 26
Despite the limited stated purpose of the bill, this puzzling deletion
has the potential to raise questions, particularly if one were to argue
that the absence has substantive significance, and could lead to un-
intended consequences, which would damage baseball at the minor
league level. 27
The most glaring example of this failure to track the language
in the Curt Flood Act is in the express list of matters not affected by
22. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 468 U.S. at 117 (suggesting insulating
product from full range of competition in marketplace is inconsistent with basic
policy of Sherman Act because of doubts about value and attractiveness of given
product); see also Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Under the rule of reason, a restraint must be evaluated to determine
whether it is significantly anticompetitive in purpose or effect. In making
this evaluation, a court generally will be required to analyze "the facts
peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why
it was imposed."
Id. (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of ProfI Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)).
23. See Hearings 1994, supra note 12, 123-24 (testimony of Stanley M. Brand).
"This is an important difference from other professional sports; unlike the NBA
and NFL, baseball's draft extends to players who will never be part of the 'major
league' team and the bargaining agent that represents them." Id. at 124.
24. See Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 27a (2000).
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See Fairness in Antitrust in National Sports (FANS) Act of 2001, S. 1704,
107th Cong. § 2 (2001) (stating purpose as "[t]o amend the Act of September 30,
1961, to limit the antitrust exemption applicable to broadcasting agreements made
by leagues of professional sports, and for other purposes").
20031
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the bill in subsection 3(b). 28 The Curt Flood Act lists six items as
unaffected matters.2 9 To accomplish lifting the antitrust exemption
only for major league franchise contraction and relocation, the sin-
gle change should have been removing from item 3 the references
to "franchise" and "relocation." 30 Nonetheless, the bill omits far
more language. 31
First, items 1 and 5 in subsection 3(b) of the Curt Flood Act
are omitted.32 These two items respectively state:
1) any conduct, acts, practices, agreements of persons en-
gaging in, conducting or participating in the business of
organized professional baseball relating to or affecting
employment to play baseball at the minor league level, any
organized professional baseball amateur or first-year
player draft, or any reserve clause as applied to minor
league players; [and]
5) the relationship between persons in the business of or-
ganized professional baseball and umpires or other indi-
viduals who are employed in the business of organized
professional baseball by such persons[.] 33
In addition, the bill edited item 3 of unaffected matters (in the pro-
posed bill item 2) by deleting the words "franchise, expansion, loca-
tion, and relocation," even though the stated purpose of the bill was
to lift the exemption only towards contraction and relocation with
respect to major league franchises. 34 If the bill's stated purpose is
accurate, issues of major league expansion or location that do not
involve relocation, as well as all franchise issues at the minor league
level, still should be covered by the exemption and should be re-
ferred to in item 3 (now 2).35
28. See id. § 3(b) (eliminating items (1) and (5) from Curt Flood Act).
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 27a(b)(1)-(6).
30. See id. § 27a(b) (3) (exempting baseball from antitrust liability with respect
to franchise expansion and relocation).
31. See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
32. See 15 U.S.C. § 27a(b) (1), (5).
33. Id.
34. S. 1704, § 3(b)(2). The pertinent section of the bill reads:
[A]ny conduct, act, practice, or agreement of a person engaging in, con-
ducting, or participating in the business of organized professional base-
ball relating to or affecting the relationship between the Office of the
Commissioner and franchise owners, the marketing of sales of the en-
tertainment product or organized professional baseball, and the licensing
of intellectual property rights owned or held by organized professional
baseball teams individually or collectively.
Id.
35. See id.
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The deletions in the proposed bill are very troubling and pos-
sess enormous potential problems for Minor League Baseball.
Many of these problems involve employment matters, drafts, and
the reserve clause as applied to minor league players.3 6 The first-
year player draft and minor league reserve clause constitute the
core incentive for major league organizations to finance the devel-
opment of minor league players, and any change in their founda-
tions could affect severely minor league economic stability.3 7 The
most troubling change is the deletion of a reference to franchise
expansion, location, and relocation matters, which removes the ex-
press protection for the minor leagues with respect to these
franchising issues. 38 Specifically, it creates a potential risk for all
minor league rules dealing with territories and territorial rights that
now protect the viability of all minor league teams, particularly at
the lower classification levels in many small and rural markets
across the country.39
Furthermore, subsection d(1) of the Curt Flood Act, provides
that "[a] s used in this section, the National Association of Profes-
sional Baseball Leagues, its member leagues and the clubs of those
leagues, are not 'in the business of organized professional major
league baseball[.'] '40 Senator Wellstone's bill deleted this lan-
guage. The reason for this deletion remains unclear, but its ab-
sence, when compared with the Curt Flood Act, is striking and
might well be interpreted as a deliberate statement by Congress
that could subject baseball to antitrust claims. This absence implies
that the antitrust exemption no longer applies to minor league
players, umpires, or franchise issues. Also, this absence could cause
the minor league to expend huge sums of money fighting these
antitrust claims, which is something the minor leagues cannot af-
ford to do. It is particularly troubling that this language has been
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 27a(3) (b) (1). The FANS Act of 2001 does not include the
following language of the Curt Flood Act of 1998:
[A]ny conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons engaging in,
conducting or participating in the business of organized professional
baseball relating to or affecting employment to play baseball at the minor
league level, any organized professional baseball amateur or first-year
player draft, or any reserve clause as applied to minor league players[.]
Id.
37. See Hearings 1994, supra note 12, at 123 (testimony of Stanley M. Brand).
38. For a discussion of these deleted issues, see supra notes 32-35 and accom-
panying text.
39. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 27a (setting forth antitrust laws with respect to
both Minor League Baseball and MLB).
40. Id. § 27a(3)(d)(1).
2003]
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omitted given the long and arduous effort Minor League Baseball
exacted to include it in the final version of the Curt Flood Act.
Beyond the impact of omitting these provisions, two more indi-
rect aspects of the bill present the possibility of serious long-term
detrimental effects. First, the bill subjects MLB to potential treble
antitrust liability for any action relating to franchise relocation. 4 1
As seen in other sports, especially football, this has caused an in
terrorem effect, such that individual franchises are now essentially
free to relocate without league oversight.42 This has created the
phenomenon by which teams essentially put themselves up for auc-
tion to the highest bidder, and has forced taxpayers in communities
to provide hundreds of millions of dollars in direct and indirect
subsidies in order to attract or to avoid losing a team. It is puzzling
why, in response to MLB's announced efforts to contract two teams,
Congress would want to pass legislation lifting the antitrust exemp-
tion for both contraction and relocation. The historic baseball anti-
trust exemption has had an obvious restraining effect on
relocations at the major league level and has served the public in-
terest well by reducing the ability of teams to force huge public sub-
sidies out of local communities. Denying immunity for relocation
decisions could also create disruption in certain AAA minor league
markets as well by subjecting those cities to uncertainties with re-
spect to contraction. Furthermore, lifting immunity with respect to
relocation is not at all justified or even suggested by the current
efforts of MLB to eliminate two teams.
How did we get from the carefully crafted provisions of the
Curt Flood Act to the reduced and inadequate minor league pro-
tections of Senator Wellstone's bill? Sponsors of this legislation and
the Major League Baseball Players Association ("MLBPA") asserted
cavalierly and falsely that the minor league exemption "carve out"
remains intact. Yet, Donald Fehr, the president of the MLBPA, only
a few years ago stated that "[t]oo much money is being wasted in
41. See Neil St. Anthony, Jim Souhan & Robert Whereatt, The Wish Is On To
Save the Twins, STAR TRmi., Nov. 14, 2001, at IA (explaining FANS Act would "make
the elimination or relocation of a baseball team subject to antitrust laws").
42. See Darren Rovell, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: Q & A, at http://espn.go.
com/mlb/s/2001/1205/1290707.html (Dec. 5, 2001) (noting threat of antitrust
lawsuits led to movement among NFL teams). In 1982, Al Davis, owner of the Los
Angeles Raiders, filed an antitrust lawsuit after the NFL disallowed him to relocate
to Oakland. See id. Davis won the lawsuit and moved his team to Oakland. See id.
Subsequently, this threat of antitrust lawsuits led to more movement among NFL
teams, such as the Cleveland Browns to Baltimore and the Los Angeles Rams to St.
Louis. See id. Besides the NFL moving seven times since the last MLB move in
1971 (Washington Senators to the Texas Rangers), the NBA has experienced seven
moves, while the NHL has had nine. See id.
[Vol. 10: p. 49
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the minor leagues." 43 Since then, the MLBPA has been the princi-
pal and relentless proponent of total and outright repeal of the an-
titrust exemption. During the consideration of the Curt Flood Act,
the union steadfastly resisted adding language to the legislation
that would have provided clear and unmistakable protection to Mi-
nor League Baseball. The union eventually relented under pres-
sure from its own congressional allies only when it became
apparent that no legislation could be passed without including lan-
guage that protected Minor League Baseball. Seemingly, the
MLBPA seeks a total repeal in order to destroy Minor League Base-
ball so that Donald Fehr can lay claim to the money "wasted" at the
minor league level, and divert it to "his" players. 44
Beyond omitting key protections for the minor leagues, the bill
erodes baseball's exemption in another aspect of its business with-
out any demonstration that it will solve problems for which it is ad-
vanced. Namely, it accelerates the unjustified momentum begun
with the Curt Flood Act by lifting aspects of the antitrust exemption
on a piecemeal basis whenever baseball makes a difficult or unpop-
ular decision. Rather than deal directly with the event that gener-
ated concern (planned contraction), the bill, like the Curt Flood
Act, erodes a long-standing legal principle that has served the pub-
lic well. This makes it politically easier to lift the immunity even
further when the next problem arises, a trend that undoubtedly will
have adverse affects on Minor League Baseball. This is bad public
policy and will hasten the demise of grassroots baseball, without giv-
ing any assurance that the desired result will be achieved.
There has been much discussion of the lack of competitive bal-
ance at the major league level and the economic remedies available
to restore healthy on-field competition to baseball. What is seldom
mentioned as part of the discussion is the role of the exemption in
buttressing competition at the major league level through minor
league player development.45 In the event of a repeal, major and
43. Ross Newhan, Fehr Ball or Foul? Players Union Executive Head Stays Within
Strict Guidelines Mhen Forced To Deal with Baseball's Intransigent Owners, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 10, 1994, at CIO.
44. See id. (claiming money wasted on minor leagues should instead be used
to push kids to college by subsidizing professional summer league programs for
students).
45. SeeJeff Friedman, Comment, Antitrust Exemption Vital for Minor League Sur-
vival MLB & Parent Clubs Must Put Money Behind 1991 Stadium Standards, DEPAULJ.
SPoRTs LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (2001-2002) (explaining role of exemption en-
ables MLB to benefit from improved player development occurring in Minor
League Baseball), available at http://140.192.57.122/lawslj/comments/antitrust-
exemption.asp. "The antitrust exemption allows MLB to make an educated judg-
ment on a proposed relocation" for a minor league club. Id. Otherwise, franchise
20031
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minor league teams presumably will be free to compete openly for
the signing of baseball player prospects. Players signed by major
league teams could be placed either on the major league roster
(currently forty players) or assigned to minor league teams for fur-
ther development. Free of standardized player contracts with fixed
salaries and reserve periods, major league teams would compete for
top prospects. This competition will upset the competitive balance
essential to baseball's viability. Wealthier teams would be in a posi-
tion to outbid smaller market teams for available first-year draft tal-
ent. This can only exacerbate the "competitive problems" detailed
in the Report of the Independent Members of the Commissioner's Blue Rib-
bon Panel on Baseball Economics. 46
If a repeal triggers unbridled competition in the payment of
salaries for minor league players, the rich simply get richer at the
expense of less prosperous clubs. This scenario is identical to that
of the 1940s and 50s, when Branch Rickey of the St. Louis Cardinals
purchased a large number of minor league teams to stock the ma-
jor league Cardinals. 47
While professional football and basketball look to college tal-
ent for developing professional players, grave doubt exists that col-
owners may decide to relocate based on financial reasons, which could lead to the
destruction of minor league clubs and lessen America's interest in baseball on the
whole. See id. With MLB supporting them, minor league clubs can bargain for
more money from their respective cities for stadium renovations. See id. Thus,
minor league clubs benefit from new facilities, while MLB reaps the benefits of
improved player development. See id.
46. See Summer 2000: Report on the Blue Ribbon Panel Report, OUTSIDE THE LINES
(SABR Bus. of Baseball Comm., Cleveland, Ohio), Summer 2000 (explaining com-
petitive problems arise from revenues and player payrolls, as illustrated by compar-
ing payrolls to on-field performance), available at http://www.roadside
photos.com/baseball/blueribbon.htm; see also BENJAMIN G. RADER, BASEBALL: A
HISTORy OF AMERICA'S GAME 131 (Univ. of I1l. Press 1992) (indicating recruitment
of new players far more cost-effective when left in hands of minor league
franchises). Mr. Rader noted:
[N]either the major league nor the high-level minor league club need
employ a bevy of scouts or take the risks of investing in dozens of players
who never would make it to the higher echelons of baseball. A player
who had proven his potential in minor league competition could then be
purchased; if the minor league franchise set the price too high, the player
would eventually become subject to the draft (at a set price) by a club
higher in organized baseball's hierarchy.
Id.
47. See RADER, supra note 46, at 130-32. Mr. Rader related:
By far the most important of Rickey's innovations, however, was the St.
Louis farm system .... Prior to Rickey, conventional wisdom had held
that such a system would not be cost-effective .... Had it not been for the
near collapse of the draft system in the 1920s Rickey would probably
never have broken with the traditional mode of player acquisition.
[Vol. 10: p. 49
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leges could, or should, fill the void. As colleges currently organize
their baseball programs, there is little hope that colleges can train
baseball players as effectively as the minor leagues do. Baseball is
played primarily during the summer when colleges are closed. The
NCAA will not permit students to play in the minor leagues without
forfeiting their college baseball eligibility. 48 Some have argued that
the "summer leagues," such as the Alaskan and the Cape Cod
leagues, may fill the gap during the summer months when colleges
are closed. 49 Nonetheless, such leagues are not competitive
enough nor are their seasons long enough to develop talent as well
as the traditional minor leagues. It is questionable whether their
existing caliber of play could be preserved if the summer leagues
were expanded should the minor league fail.
In addition, one can assume that minor league teams usually
have better coaches, facilities, and competition than college teams
because the minor leagues are subsidized by the billion-dollar in-
dustry of MLB. 50 In college, students play baseball at most three to
four times per week for only three months, yet it remains an ex-
tremely difficult sport requiring considerable skill, finesse, and con-
stant practice to hone one's skills. These skills are best developed
in the minor leagues where players play every day for six to seven
months out of the year.51 Only then do prospects normally advance
to the major leagues. In fact, college baseball players usually re-
quire two to three years of additional development before they are
prepared to play in the major leagues. 52 Thus, it is not surprising
that many players who excel in college never make it to the major
league level when additional development is needed after college.
One seriously must doubt whether the NCAA would permit
MLB to invest in collegiate baseball programs on terms that are ac-
48. See Permissible/Impermissible Educational Expenses, at wwwl.ncaa.org/mem-
bership/membership-svcs/eligibility-recruiting/ed-expenses.html (last visited
Nov. 19, 2002) (stating receipt of payment for athletic skill renders student ineligi-
ble for intercollegiate competition).
49. See Newhan, supra note 43, at CIO (emphasizing importance of profes-
sional summer leagues for college students as opposed to over-financed minor
league clubs).
50. See Hearings 1994, supra note 12, at 117 (noting MLB finances minor
leagues).
51. See Friedman, supra note 45, at http://140.192.57.122/lawslj/comments/
antitrustexemption.asp (recognizing minor league setting created largely to en-
hance player development for MLB).
52. See Joshua P. Jones, A Congressional Swing and Miss: The Curt Flood Act,
Player Control, and the National Pastime, 33 GA. L. REv. 639, 684-86 (1999) (explain-
ing due to skill needed in MLB, four years at collegiate level will not be enough to
maintain current performance level of present day MLB players).
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ceptable to MLB. Surely, the NCAA would require that all NCAA
baseball programs be treated alike, and that all receive the same
level of financial support from MLB teams. The logistics of financ-
ing such a system would be insurmountable, not to mention the
chaos created by mixing professional and amateur sports programs
together.
Other sports illustrate that it is inadvisable to create an alterna-
tive player development system that commingles professionalism
and education.53 Colleges ought to concentrate on developing
"major league" doctors, scientists, and educators, not major league
ballplayers. It is foreseeable that creating greater reliance on col-
lege baseball as a player development system will expose baseball to
the scandals and conflicts that have blemished other college
sports.5
4
The effect of contraction and a repeal of the antitrust exemp-
tion can be demonstrated by examining the Harrisburg Senators
minor league club. The Harrisburg Senators franchise is under a
player development contract ("PDC") with the Montreal Expos. 55
The Senators serve as the Expos AA affiliate for player develop-
ment, while the Expos are a major league team frequently consid-
ered a contraction candidate. 56
The City of Harrisburg had a minor league team until 1952
when the team disbanded.57 In 1987, behind the vision and efforts
of Mayor Stephen R. Reed, the city was able to attract a franchise to
a proposed new stadium in Harrisburg.58 Built as a "throw-back"
stadium with bench seating and cantilevered overhangs, the city's
construction of Riverside Stadium signaled the return of baseball to
Pennsylvania's capital city. Although the local media chided the
53. See generally Tanyon T. Lynch, Quid Pro Quo: Restoring Educational Primacy to
College Basketball, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 595, 608 (2002) (suggesting college
sports are becoming training grounds for professional careers while student-ath-
lete education is being compromised).
54. See id. at 621-25 (illustrating effect NBA has on NCAA basketball players
and specifically acknowledging that college basketball is number one recruiting
system for NBA, but college basketball players have lowest graduation rates of all
college athletes).
55. See History of the Harrisburg Senators, at http://senatorsbaseball.com/his
tory.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2002) [hereinafter History] (noting Senators affilia-
tion switched from Pittsburgh Pirates to Montreal Expos in 1991).
56. See Murray Chass, Selig Isn't Ready To Call Off Contraction, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
27, 2001, at S5 (noting Montreal Expos expected to be eliminated by contraction,
along with Minnesota Twins).
57. See History, supra note 55.
58. See Matt Assad, Harrisburg Tells Baseball Success Story; Mayor Says Team Aided
City's Economic Recovery, MORNING CALL, Sept. 3, 1994, at B3 (indicating Mayor
Reed's involvement with Senators brought pride back to Harrisburg).
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proposal as a pipe dream and extraordinary effort was critical to its
fulfillment, the return of baseball to the City of Harrisburg was a
tremendous success. 59
Not long after baseball returned to Harrisburg, the then-own-
ers of the Harrisburg Senators franchise announced that the team
would be relocating to a proposed state-of-the-art stadium in
Springfield, Massachusetts at the expiration of its Riverside Stadium
lease in 1996.60 In recognition of the overwhelming interest to pro-
tect the city's investment in reviving baseball in Harrisburg, con-
structing Riverside Stadium, and the economic benefits derived
from the franchise, the Mayor initiated negotiations to purchase
the Senators. 61 During the negotiations, the city took other actions
to protect its interest in baseball. In July 1995, the City of Harris-
burg filed a lawsuit against the City of Springfield alleging interfer-
ence with contract-related issues, and also filed an expansion
application with MLB. The lawsuit created a debate regarding the
actions of the Mayor of Springfield, who, after using the baseball
issue as a campaign asset, was derided by the media for "stealing" a
team from Pennsylvania's capital city. Shortly after filing the law-
suit, Springfield was forced to back down. 62 Harrisburg was then
able to negotiate the purchase of the team, but not without paying
a then-record sum of $6.7 million for a AA club.6 3 Accordingly, the
City withdrew the lawsuit against Springfield and its expansion
application.6 4
59. See id. (noting Senators arrived on Harrisburg's City Island in 1987 during
end of economic downturn). "Since the baseball project, [Mayor] Reed estimates
the city has enjoyed nearly 300 development projects amounting to about $800
million." Id.
60. See Megan O'Matz, Harrisburg Strikes Deal for Senators; City Will Pay $6.7
Million To Keep Baseball Team, MORNING CALL, July 8, 1995, at A3 (indicating possi-
ble team relocation to Springfield, Massachusetts after 1996 season).
61. See id. The NAPBL encouraged the present owners of the Senators to
renew talks with the City of Harrisburg. See id. "When it became clear that the
present owners would not back down from their demand for a new stadium in
Harrisburg, the mayor . . . offered, for the second time, to buy the team." Id.
Without the team, "Harrisburg risked losing up to $10 million a year in goods,
services and salaries," and would have to spend up to $13 million to bring in an-
other minor league club. Id.
62. See O'Matz, supra note 60, at A3 (noting intensive discussions and negotia-
tions took place, which allowed Harrisburg to keep minor league team).
63. See id. (stating City of Harrisburg bought Senators baseball club for $6.7
million). Mayor Reed was reluctant to have the city put up such a large sum of
money and become the buyer of the team. See id. Nonetheless, he realized, "[i]f
you want to keep baseball in Harrisburg, you're just going to have to buy the
team." Id.
64. See id. (discussing moot nature of expansion application after city pur-
chased team).
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Shortly before completing the purchase, Harrisburg estab-
lished a corporate entity, which currently runs the Harrisburg Sena-
tors franchise. 65 The franchise is owned and operated by a for-
profit entity, the Harrisburg Civic Baseball Club, Inc. ("HCBC") of
which the city owns 100% of its stock.66 The city also owns and
operates Riverside Stadium, which is located on Harrisburg's City
Island, and has invested in excess of ten million dollars in its con-
struction, upgrade, and maintenance since 1987.67 The city also in-
corporated City Island Catering, Inc. ("CIC"), a for-profit entity that
provides all concessionaire services at Riverside Stadium and at
other venues and kiosks open to the public around the stadium.
The city owns 100% of the stock in CIC as well. Although this was a
costly transaction, ownership of the franchise assures the commu-
nity that the Harrisburg Senators will continue to play on City Is-
land in perpetuity.
The return of baseball has been a great success story for Harris-
burg and particularly the Mayor, who is entering an unprecedented
fifth term.68 Baseball brings millions of dollars to the city, consider-
ing the other businesses such as arcades, batting cages, and minia-
ture golf courses that surround the stadium. 69 The city is also in
the final planning stages for the Pennsylvania Sports Hall of Fame,
and has received $9.5 million from the Commonwealth to construct
such a facility.70
The franchise has also achieved on the field success through its
affiliation with the Montreal Expos, which historically has main-
65. See id. (indicating creation of non-profit corporation).
66. See General Information, at http://www.senatorsbaseball.com/geninfo.html
(last visited Nov. 19, 2002) (indicating Harrisburg Senators are owned by Harris-
burg Civic Baseball Club).
67. See Assad, supra note 58, at B3 (detailing city's estimate of ten million
dollars for 8000-seat stadium on undeveloped site); Peter J. Shelly, Harrisburg Buys
its Baseball Team, PITTSBURGH POsT-GAZETTE, July 23, 1995, at C3 (describing how
Harrisburg has spent eighteen million dollars on City Island, including money to-
wards miniature golf courses, amusement rides, arcades, and baseball stadium).
68. See Shelly, supra note 67, at C3 (describing how Harrisburg fans "love their
Senators" and "love Stephen R. Reed").
69. See id. (stating city estimation that Senators bring between eight and ten
million dollars into Harrisburg economy).
70. See Pennsylvania Sports Hall of Fame: Delaware County Chapter, at http://www.
pasportshalloffame-dcc.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2002) (identifying Pennsylvania
Sports Hall of Fame as non-profit organization founded to perpetuate memory of
athletes, male and female, who brought lasting fame and recognition to Penn-
sylvania through their athletic achievements). A committee is currently taking ac-
tion to design and build a permanent structure to house the honor roll, plaques,
and personal memorabilia of Hall of Fame Inductees. See id.
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tained a strong minor league system. 71 Some of the players and
coaches that have come through Harrisburg include Moises Alou,
Cliff Floyd, Brad Fullmer, Mark Grudzielanek, Vladimir Guerrero,
Kirk Rueter, Ugueth Urbina, Javier Vazquez, Rondell White, Man-
ager Jim Tracy, and current Phillies pitching coach Joe Kerrigan. 72
Moreover, the Senators have won six Eastern League Champion-
ships since 1987, including four straight from 1996 through 1999. 7
3
The Senators's Championship in 1999 made national headlines
when down eleven to eight in the bottom of the ninth inning with
two outs, bases loaded, and a full count, Senators player Milton
Bradley hit a grand slam home run to win the game.74
Although the franchise achieved economic and championship
success, Harrisburg continues to subsidize the team's operations.
In 1995, the city issued taxable bonds in the amount of $7.7 million
to purchase the team and perform upgrades to the stadium. De-
spite such efforts, revenues continue to fall short of supporting the
team's operating cost and debt service. Such revenue shortfall oc-
curs even though the franchise consistently ranks in the top third of
all AA baseball franchises in net revenue and even though the city
controls all of the revenue-making assets. Without the support of
the minor leagues and the protections provided by the antitrust ex-
emption, baseball could not survive in Harrisburg, even with such
staunch public support.
The most recent threat to the franchise and its viability has
been the talk of contraction. 75 The PBA between the major and
minor leagues was signed in 1997 for a ten-year term with early ter-
mination rights beginning in September 2003 for cause or Septem-
ber 2004 and thereafter for any reason.76 The PBA sets forth a PDC
commitment, which provides that the MLB will field 160 teams
through the termination of the PBA, including thirty teams at the
AA minor league level. 77 The PBA also provides, however, that
71. See Senators' All-Time Player Roster, at http://senatorsbaseball.com/AllTime
Roster.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2002).
72. See id.
73. See History, supra note 55.
74. See Rich Mauch, Senators '99: A Team of Destiny and History, at http://www.
modeweekly.com/1999/99.09.30/Senators990930.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2002)
(providing general overview of Harrisburg Senators's 1999 season, and describing
Milton Bradley's climactic grand slam home run in bottom of ninth inning, which
won championship for Senators).
75. See generally Roberts, supra note 6, at 420 (stating subjecting major leagues
to antitrust litigation jeopardizes future of minor league teams).
76. See PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL AGREEMENT art. 111(a).
77. See PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL AGREEMENT art. VII(a).
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each PDC shall be between one major league and minor league
team unless the commissioner grants permission for a "co-op" due
to emergency financial circumstances of a major league club.7 8
According to the terms of the PBA between MLB and the
NAPBL, a AA minor league franchise of the Eastern League of Pro-
fessional Baseball is recognized in Harrisburg.79 Even with the talk
of contraction, the PBA provides some assurance that the major
leagues are contractually obligated to field a team in Harrisburg.
Yet, the prospect of a "co-op" team is not a preferred option for
Harrisburg, because "co-op" teams are usually poor quality clubs
that receive "end-of-the-bench" minor leaguers from other clubs
and have no identifiable team presence. 80 A major league team will
not send a hot prospect to a "co-op" team where it cannot keep a
close eye on him.
The mere speculation of contraction has affected adversely the
Harrisburg Senators club. Shortly after word leaked out of poten-
tial contraction during the 2001 World Series, the Senators
franchise received frantic calls from sponsors and fans who did not
understand the intricacies of the contractual relationships between
the major and minor leagues.8 Because of this lack of understand-
ing, sponsors and fans provided only down payments for advertise-
ments and season tickets for the 2002 season in fear that baseball
might not be played in Harrisburg. The franchise has not recov-
ered fully, as revenues have fallen short of budget projections.
With the major leagues considering contraction, HCBC identi-
fied certain actions that would be available to protect its interest in
the franchise. As an initial and practical matter, HCBC would rely
on the NAPBL, the ruling body of the minor leagues, to protect its
interest. The influence of the NAPBL was most recently on display
during the proposed passage of the Curt Flood Act in 1998 as dis-
cussed above.82
78. See PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL AGREEMENT art. VII (c) (4).
79. See Eastern League Baseball, at http://www.easternleague.com/teams.htm
(last visited Sept. 25, 2002) (indicating AA minor league franchise Harrisburg Sen-
ators is recognized in Eastern League as Montreal Expos affiliate).
80. See Rob White, Contraction Affects Minors If Major League Clubs Dissolve,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 22, 2001, at 3C (explaining "co-op" teams struggle to
compete because they are usually stocked with players of marginal ability).
81. See Jeffrey P. Ouellet, Baseball and Contraction: Economic Necessity or Another
Symptom of Greed in Sports?, at http://www.pasportstalk.com/sportsagent-
vol3I.shtml (last visited Nov. 19, 2002) (stating views on how elimination of major
league franchise Montreal Expos via contraction will affect its minor league AA
affiliate Harrisburg Senators).
82. See Roberts, supra note 6 (describing pressure exerted on Congress by
NAPBL). The NAPBL saw the Curt Flood Act as a potential source of mischief,
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Recently, Minor League Baseball President Mike Moore stated
on November 6th, 2001:
We plan on baseball being played by all of our franchises
next season . . . Commissioner Selig has indicated to me
that following any definitive decisions on contraction, we
will work closely in formulating solutions pertaining to the
minor leagues. The commissioner has been a strong sup-
porter and ally of minor league baseball and we will con-
tinue to work together toward our common goals.8 3
With the assistance of the NABPL, the following options would be
available for the Senators's franchise in the face of contraction.
The Senators franchise could lobby for the dissolution of the lowest
producing AA team, rather than the Senators franchise. Because
the Senators franchise consistently ranks in the top-half in attend-
ance and top-third in net revenue, the argument would be that it
would be more prudent to dissolve a team in a weaker city and al-
low the Senators to assume that franchise's PDC.8 4 The Senators
franchise could also lobby for a "buy-out" from the major leagues,
similar to what was proposed to the owners of the Expos and
Twins.85 This is not, however, a preferred option for the city. In-
stead, HCBC could bring a cause of action against the major
leagues for breach of the PBA, which requires the major leagues to
provide players for 160 minor league teams, including a team in
Harrisburg. 86 Due to the city's lease agreement with the stadium,
the city could sue HCBC for breach of the lease, and HCBC could
sue to join the major leagues for violation of the PBA. Finally, in
and lobbied for the inclusion of several provisions that provide substantial legal aid
and comfort to the NAPBL in its effort to protect itself from the coverage of the
antitrust laws. See id.
83. Mike Eisenbath, Is Baseball's Contraction a Ploy For Negotiations or a Necessity,
ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Nov. 11, 2001, at D7 (quoting Minor League Baseball
President, and stipulating existing farm clubs might continue in different form as
co-op teams with only differences being that players would belong to different or-
ganizations and staffers would be employed by MLB).
84. See Senators Break Attendance Record, at http://www.easternleague.com/
release.taf?release=157 (last visited Sept. 25, 2002) (stating team drew 283,661 fans
to Riverside Stadium during 2002 regular season). The Senators have topped the
200,000 mark for sixteen consecutive seasons. See id.
85. See Eisenbath, supra note 83, at D7 (indicating ownership proposal to own-
ers of Montreal Expos and Minnesota Twins franchises respectively).
86. See Richard Sandomir, Contraction Plans Put Minor League Affiliates in Limbo,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2001, at S4 (noting minor league franchises are protected from
potential effects of contraction by PBA, which provides that 160 minor league
teams will be operated through 2003). While contraction might eventually come
to the minor leagues, it will not necessarily impact the minor league teams affili-
ated with the major league clubs that are eliminated. See id.
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order to preserve baseball in Harrisburg, the city and HCBC could
also seek to affiliate with another major league team. This was not a
viable option for the 2002 season given that PDCs must be negoti-
ated during a twenty-day period in September of every year.8 7 At-
tracting another franchise would also be difficult because even
though Riverside Stadium was built in 1987, over $650 million has
been invested in minor league ballparks during the "stadium
boom" of the 1990s, and Riverside Stadium does not have many of
the amenities these newer ballparks possess. 88 Although Riverside
Stadium is a charming venue, it cannot match the concessions,
superboxes, and, more importantly, hitting tunnels, inside pitching
mounds, and revamped locker rooms that other stadiums possess.89
The city has plans for upgrades to the stadium, but with a price tag
of twelve million dollars, the city does not have the financial where-
withal to invest in the stadium at this time.90
Commissioner Selig, in testifying last December before the
House Judiciary Committee, stated that it was not necessarily the
case that minor league clubs would be contracted if their affiliated
major league club ceased to exist.91 There are a number of ways in
which this issue can be addressed, including: 1) assumption by
other major league clubs of the contracted clubs' minor league
87. See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL RULES § 56(d) (2002) (prescribing proce-
dures for negotiating player development contracts).
88. See Laura Petrecca, Fun and Games: MLB Boosts Entertainment at the Ballpark,
ADvERTISING AGE, Apr. 3, 2000, at 32 (detailing unprecedented new stadium-build-
ing boom in which state-of-the-art stadiums merged sports and entertainment to
create amusement park atmosphere for families while also providing corporate-
pleasing amenities, including more luxury boxes, which lead to greater revenue).
89. See Edward Gunts, Only the Players Are Minor-League: Extra Touches Set Ripken
Stadium Apart from Other Family Ballparks, BALT. SUN, June 16, 2002, at 3E (describ-
ing newly-built eighteen million-dollar minor league ballpark with features one
might expect in larger stadiums, from wide seats with built-in cup holders to air-
conditioned club level and skyboxes); see also Don Muret, New Ballpark Making
Waves in SAL, AMUSEMENT Bus., Mar. 19, 2001, at 19 (noting renovations to minor
league facility in which two clubhouses were installed, as well as new dugouts, bull-
pens, restrooms, office space, and ticket operations booths being built).
90. See James O'Toole, Stadium Issue No Divider, PITTSBURGH POsT-GAzETTE,
Apr. 29, 2001, at Al (describing political conflict resulting from Harrisburg
Mayor's tactics to obtain funding for minor league stadium from state legislature).
91. See Selig's Testimony Submitted in Advance; Testimony of Allan H. (Bud) Selig,
Commissioner of Baseball, Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary United States House of
Rep. (Dec. 6, 2001), available at http://www.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/news/
mlbnewsstory.jsp?articleid=mlb_20011206_seligtestimony-news&teamid=min;
see also Bob Dart, Baseball Economics 'Broken, 'ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 7, 2001, at
6F (citing testimony that MLB lost nearly $1.4 billion from 1995 to 2001, and con-
traction is first step toward fixing system); Peter Schmuck, House Rips into Selig,
Baseball, BALT. SUN, Dec. 7, 2001, at ID (mentioning testimony and indicating MLB
is in dire financial trouble and needs to eliminate two franchises to improve indus-
try's revenue picture).
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PDCs; or 2) maintenance of the contracted minor league clubs'
PDCs on a "cooperative" or shared basis among several major
league clubs. Suffice it to say that the minor leagues will be working
cooperatively to preserve the viable minor league clubs, like Harris-
burg, in the event of major league contraction.
Finally, a related issue to contraction and antitrust exemption
is the Senators's territorial rights, which are protected under the
Curt Flood Act.92 The antitrust exemption allows for territorial
rights, and the territory of the Harrisburg Senators franchise in-
cludes Dauphin County as well as a fifteen-mile buffer surrounding
the county.93 The fifteen-mile buffer around Dauphin County in-
cludes York County, Pennsylvania. The City of York, in York
County, has sought to lure a minor league franchise to its city for
the past seven years.94 Even more recently, the City of Lancaster,
also in the Senators's territory, has sought to bring Minor League
Baseball to a new proposed stadium in its city.95
92. See Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 27a(3) (b) (3) (2000) (stating
franchise expansion, location or relocation, franchise ownership issues, and rela-
tionship between Office of Commissioner and franchise owners continue to enjoy
protection from any antitrust action).
93. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT 10.06(B). "All grants of protected
territory to minor league clubs must first be approved by the President of the Mi-
nor League Association and by the Commissioner." Id.; see also NATIONAL ASSOCIA-
TION AGREEMENT 10.06(C). An exception to this rule allows a club to play its games
within another club's protected area pursuant to a grant of protected territory or
the written consent of each major or minor league club upon whose home terri-
tory is infringed. See id. "The 15-mile 'buffer' is not included as part of a club's
home territory and may coincide (in whole or in part) with the 15-mile 'buffer'
surrounding another club's home territory." MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL RULES
§ 52(b)(2) (2002); see also NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT 10.06(C). If the
boundary of a minor league club's territory overlaps or is within fifteen miles of
another territory, the minor league club cannot relocate inside its own territory to
a location closer to the boundary of the other club's territory. See NATIONAL AsSO-
CIATION AGREEMENT 10.06(D). An exception to this rule allows the minor league
club to relocate to a location closer to the other club's boundary if it obtains writ-
ten consent from the affected clubs and league or the President of the National
Association of Professional Baseball authorizes an exception. See id.
94. See Timothy B. Wheeler, Baseball Vision for Faded York, BALT. SUN, July 23,
1999, at IA (discerning city officials and business leaders desire to lure Minor
League Baseball team in hopes of urban revival); see also David O'Connor, York Gets
High Marks for Pro Baseball, LANCASTER NEW ERA, Apr. 2, 1999, at Bi (citing report
predicting that minor league team in York would be among top performers in
professional baseball); Justin Quinn, Batter Up: Fans, League Feel Team Would Work,
INTELLIGENCERJ., Aug. 1, 2001, at Al (quoting location scout's opinion that inde-
pendent Minor League Baseball team in York County would complement existing
major league farm teams in Harrisburg and Reading).
95. See O'Connor, supra note 94, at Bi (detailing former mayor's effort to
bring team to Lancaster because "Lancaster is overdue for a team" in league with
natural rivals like Harrisburg, Reading, and York); see also League Says Lancaster, PA
Has Good Chance To Win Minor-League Baseball Team, LANCASTER NEW ERA, Oct. 25,
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Without the territorial rights afforded by the antitrust exemp-
tion, the Harrisburg franchise would be affected adversely by ex-
pansion in neighboring communities. In turn, such expansion
would harm each of these communities through over-expansion.
Thus, the antitrust exemption presumes the viability of the
franchise and prevents the saturation of markets.
2001 (identifying Atlantic League official's opinion that prospects are promising
for Lancaster to be awarded minor league franchise if it meets certain conditions).
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